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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OSMAN HOME IMPROVEMENT; 
UNITED STAFFING; CREDIT GEN-
ERAL INSURANCE, 
Case No. 970406-CA 
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vs. Priority Number 7 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH; UNINSURED EMPLOY- Industrial Commission Case No. 
ERS' FUND; ARNULFO STEVEN 951041 
SOSA; ENRIQUE SOSA, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH 
All statutory citations are to Utah Code Annotated (1996) unless otherwise 
stated. The 1997 Utah Legislature re-enacted the Workers Compensation Act. 
The revised Act took effect July 1, 1997. The accident which lies at the heart of 
1 
this case occurred under the old Act, as did the adjudication of that claim. 
Accordingly, we will refer to the Workers Compensation Act as it existed prior 
to the 1997 re-enactment. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 35-1-86 grant the court jurisdiction 
of this appeal.1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The only issue which the Petitioners present for the court's review is 
whether Osman Home Improvement was Arnulfo Sosa's sole employer when he 
fell off a roof on July 22, 1995. 
The standard of review is correction of error. The facts are not in dispute. 
Accordingly, the nature of the relationship between the injured employee, 
Arnulfo Sosa, and Osman Home Improvment and Enrique Sosa is a question of 
law which the Court of Appeals will review for correctness. BB & B 
Transportation vs. Industrial Commission, 893 P. 2d 611 (Utah App. 1995). 
Jurisdiction of appeals from the Labor Commission still rests with the 
Court of Appeals under the 1997 re-enactment of the Workers Compensation 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(8). 
2 
The issue arose due to the Industrial Commission's decision to grant a 
motion for review filed by Enrique Sosa and the Uninsured Employers' Fund . 
That was a final Order and nothing further is required by the Petitioners, the 
parties aggrieved by the Commission's decision, to preserve the issue for review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1995) is the determinative statute. It is lengthy 
and is reproduced in the addendum, Tab 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a workers compensation claim which the Applicant, Arnulfo (Steve) 
Sosa, brought as a result of injuries he suffered on July 22, 1995, when he fell 
off a roof. Mr. Sosa filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah on December 7, 1995. The application named Osman Home 
Improvement as Mr. Sosa's employer. At the request of the Petitioners, the 
Industrial Commission added Enrique Sosa and the Uninsured Employers Fund 
as additional parties defendant. 
On November 25, 1996, one of the Commission's administrative law 
judges conducted an evidentiary hearing. On January 30, 1997, the ALJ issued 
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her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, which concluded that 
Osman Home Improvement was Arnulfo Sosa's statutory employer, that Enrique 
Sosa was Arnulfo's common law employer, and that they were jointly liable for 
the payment of workers compensation benefits to Steve Sosa. Enrique Sosa had 
no workers compensation insurance. The ALJ found that he was unable to pay 
Arnulfo Sosa's workers compensation benefits and ordered the Uninsured 
Employers Fund to pay Enrique Sosa's share. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund and Enrique Sosa moved for review of the 
ALJ's order. The Industrial Commission granted that motion, concluding that 
Enrique was not Steve's employer and that Osman Home Improvement was his 
sole employer. The Petitioners appeal the Commission's decision to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Petitioners do not dispute that Arnulfo Sosa was hurt in a compensable 
industrial accident on July 22, 1995, and that he is entitled to compensation and 
benefits under the Utah Workers Compensation Act.2 They part ways with the 
2The Petitioners also no not dispute that Osman failed to obtain a certificate 
of workers compensation insurance, per §35-l-42(6)(e), and, accordingly, is a 
statutory employer under §35-l-42(6)(a). 
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Commission, the Uninsured Employers Fund and Enrique Sosa on the issue of 
whether Enrique Sosa was Arnulfo Sosa's employer when he fell off the roof, 
and that is the issue which they ask the Court to decide. 
The fact that two of the parties have the same last name can be confusing. 
For purposes of clarity, we will refer to Arnfiilfo Sosa by his nickname, Steve, 
and Enrique Sosa by his given name. 
The Petitioners do not dispute the Commission's findings of fact. The 
statement of facts which follows is a recitation of the Commission's findings, 
augmented by the testimony of Steve and Enrique Sosa. 
1. In the summer of 1995, Osman Home Improvement ("Osman") had a 
contract to install roofing and to waterproof decks and breezeways on new 
apartment buildings on 90th South in Sandy, Utah. (R. 359, 174) 
2. Enrique found out about the job when he read an ad in the paper that 
Osman was hiring roofers. (R. 359-60, 157) 
3. Enrique has been a roofer for 11 years who has worked for "practically 
the whole State of California". (R. 146) 
4. Osman furnished no tools. Enrique furnished all of the expensive tools 
5 
to perform the job. That included a staple gun, nailer, compressor, Skil saw, 
hoses and ladders. (R. 360, 154) 
5. Steve, on the other hand, provided a hammer, a pouch and a rope. (R. 
132) 
6. Osman agreed to pay Enrique $14 per square3 to install felt4 and 
shingles on the roofs of the apartments. (R. 360, 152) 
7. Enrique set his own hours. He testified that he could work five days a 
week, four days a week or seven days a week. (R. 360, 139) Steve was under 
the impression that he and Enrique could decide which days they wanted to work. 
(R. 125) 
9. Enrique told Steve about the job he had with Osman. (R. 360, 108) 
Steve testified that he met Osman some three weeks before his accident. Steve 
recalled that when he met Michael Osman, the president of Osman Home 
Improvement, Enrique said, "vThis is my nephew, and so is it okay if he comes 
to work with me?' And asked him if I could work, you know, if I could work for 
3A "square" is the area covered by 100 square feet of installed shingles. A 
roof of 1000 square feet would have 10 square. 
4
 "Felt" is tar paper which is applied to the roof before the shingles. 
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him - or us. I mean for Mike." (R. 116) 
10. Enrique remembers that he introduced Steve to Osman and told him 
that Steve would be working with him and that Osman sealed the agreement with 
an "okay look". (R. 137). Note: According to Enrique, Osman said nothing to 
evidence his assent. He merely gave Enrique an "okay look". (R. 8) 
11. The Commission found that Steve's pay was negotiated between 
Enrique and Steve. (R. 360). Note that Osman, the purported sole employer, 
was not privy to that agreement. Steve remembers that Enrique told him he 
would be earning $10 per hour because he would be getting $10 per square and 
he would install about a square an hour. (R. 59) Since Enrique had contracted to 
install the roofing at a rate of $14 per square, he stood to make $4 per square 
from Steve's work. 
12. Enrique, Steve's alleged co-employee, testified that he brought Steve 
on as his apprentice and that he had absolute control over how much Steve was to 
make. According to Enrique, he could pay the apprentice five dollars per hour 
or he could pay him nothing. (R. 150) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission 
because Enrique Sosa retained and exercised absolute control over Steve Sosa. 
As such, he was Steve's employer. Although Osman Home Improvement also 
retained control over aspects of Steve's work, that does not vitiate Enrique's role 
as Steve's employer. As noted any number of times by this court and the 
Supreme Court, in workers compensation cases an employee may have two 
employers. Steve Sosa had two employers when he fell off the roof on July 22, 
1995. 
ARGUMENT 
ENRIQUE SOSA WAS STEVE SOSA'S EMPLOYER AT THE TIME STEVE 
SOSA FELL FROM THE ROOF. 
Under the Workers Compensation Act, an employer is any person who 
regularly employs one or more workers in the same business, or in or about the 
same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied. Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-42(2). The critical factor which determines whether an employer-
employee relationship exists is whether the putative employer retains the right to 
control his prospective employee. BB & B Transportation vs. Industrial Com-
8 
mission. 893 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1995); Kinne vs. Industrial Commission. 609 
P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). These cases also clearly establish that an employee may 
have two employers under the Workers Compensation Act. 
BB & B Transportation vs, Industrial Commission, 893 P.2d 611 (Utah 
App. 1995) is on point with the facts of this case. It considered the liability for 
workers compensation benefits where two entities controlled aspects of work 
performed by a person injured in an industrial accident. In BB & BT as in the 
instant case, the Industrial Commission assigned all of the liability for death 
benefits under the Workers Compensation Act to BB & B Transportation, which 
had leased a truck from one Mark Bundy. Under the agreement between BB & B 
and Bundy, Bundy had the responsibility for hiring drivers, setting wages, hours 
and working conditions of the drivers as well as for training and disciplining 
them. BB & B retained the right to "request" that Bundy not use any particular 
driver and Bundy had to comply with that request. The agreement between 
Bundy and BB & B provided that the latter retained complete care, custody and 
control of the driver and the exclusive right to dispatch the driver. The agree-
ment required the driver to check in with BB & B each morning before 10:00 
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a.m., Monday though Friday, and obtain BB & B's permission before hauling 
any load. PhiUipson, one of BB & B/Bundy's drivers, was killed on the job. 
The Industrial Commission found that BB & B was the deceased driver's sole 
employer at the time of his accident. This Court reversed, noting that an em-
ployee could have two employers for purposes of the Workers Compensation 
Act. BB & B and Bundy were jointly responsible for the payment of death 
benefits to PhiUipson's heir. Both employers are liable under a theory that the 
employee is serving both employers and is under the control of both. 
In this case, Enrique Sosa takes full marks in the right to control test. In 
every critical aspect of Steve Sosa's job, Enrique called the shots. Enrique 
determined how much Steve would earn for his labors. Enrique dictated the 
hours they would work. Although Steve provided his own personal tools, his 
hammer, pouch and safety rope, Enrique provided the expensive tools - the 
compressor, staple gun, ladders, etc. 
Critically, Osman Home Improvement was not privy to Enrique's agree-
ment with Steve regarding his wages. Indeed, the sole manifestation of Michael 
Osman's alleged commitment to hire Steve was an "okay look" when Enrique 
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introduced him to Steve. Osman did not dictate the hours that Enrique would 
be at work. Although Osman provided the roofing materials, he supplied none of 
the tools that Enrique and Steve used. 
The Industrial Commission concluded that Osman had the right to control 
Enrique. In that, the Commission was absolutely correct. Osman Home Im-
provement retained authority over the job including the right to fire roofers and 
to require roofers to obtain its permission before hiring any assistants. That 
retention of control renders by Osman does not negate the control which Enrique 
Sosa retained and exercised over Steve. 
As noted above, Enrique Sosa profited personally from Steve's labors. 
Osman paid Enrique $14.00 per square and Enrique paid Steve $10.00, netting 
Enrique $4.00 per square. 
The Commission's order granting Enrique's motion for review ignored the 
holdings of BB & B and Kinne. supra. An injured employee may have two 
employers where each retains control and the employee serves both employers. 
Steve Sosa had two employers. His first employer was his uncle, Enrique Sosa, 
who made money from Steve's labors and who determined how much Steve 
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earned, who set the hours Steve worked and who furnished most of the tools 
Steve used. The second employer was Osman Home Improvement who merely 
retained the right to control some aspects of Enrique's work. Both employers 
had sufficient control to make them liable for Steve's workers compensation and 
benefits. 
The Commission concluded that Osman was Steve' sole employer. In 
doing so it pointed to the fact that Enrique agreed to be paid on the basis of how 
many squares of roofing he installed, and that Osman retained the right to fire its 
roofers. Those factors alone do not necessarily make Enrique an employee of 
Osman. In Graham vs. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah, 1984), the 
Supreme Court upheld an order of the Industrial Commission that a roofer was 
an independent contractor even though the general contractor paid him on the 
basis of squares installed, furnished nails and roofing materials, directed when 
the roofer would perform his work, told the roofer to cease work on two homes 
and begin work on another, and dictated how certain minor aspects of the work 
would be performed. Clearly, the fact that Osman agreed to pay Enrique by the 
square and retained some control does not necessarily dictate that Osman was 
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Enrique's employer, much less support the conclusion that Osman was Steve 
Sosa's sole employer. 
The mere fact that a contractor retains some right to control the work of its 
subcontractors does not, and should not, render the contractor the sole employer 
of its subcontractor's employees. Occupational safety and health laws require 
contractors to police their subcontractors to insure that they comply with OSHA 
regulations. If a subcontractor violates one of those regulations, both the 
contractor and the subcontractor may be cited and fined for the safety violations 
of its subcontractors. Secretary of Labor vs. Blount International, Inc.. 15 BNA 
OSHC 1897, 1991-93 CCH OSHD 129,854 (OSHRC, 1992). Further, every 
contractor has obligations to the owner or general contractor with whom he has 
contracted. Among those covenants, typically, are completion dates, standards of 
performance, etc. Each contractor must be able to require performance from his 
subcontractors that will allow him to meet his obligations to the owner of the 
project, or the general contractor. When a contractor requires his subcontractors 
to start and finish their work by a specified date it should not mean that he is now 
the sole employer of the subcontractor's employees. 
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CONCLUSION 
Steve Sosa had two employers when he sustained injuries on July 22, 1995. 
The Industrial Commission committed error by focusing solely on the right of 
control retained by Osman Home Improvement. The control actually exercised 
by Enrique Sosa renders him jointly liable for Steve's workers compensation and 
beneifts. This Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's order which 
found that the Osman Home Improvement was Steve Sosa's sole employer and 
determine that Osman and Enrique are jointly liable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | day of October, 1997. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
/ Um^c /Ml 
Thomas C. Sturdy \ y 
Attorney for Osman Home Improvement, 
United Staffing, Credit General Insurance, 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
Tabl 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1996) 
Employers enumerated and defined - Regularly employed - Statutory employers. 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state 
are considered employers under this title. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this title prescribed in 
Section 35-1-60, the state is considered to be a single employer and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, 
college, university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public 
utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more 
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same 
establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written is 
considered an employer under this title. As used in Subsection (2): 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the trade, 
business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance 
of any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of the employer 
in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or 
control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or 
piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title 
58, Chapter 59, Employee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is considered the 
employer of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation benefits 
for them by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a) or (b) and commission 
rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a risk showing the leasing 
company as the named insured and each client company as an additional insured 
by means of individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the commission as directed by rule. 
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this title 
if: 
(i) the employer's employees are all members of the employer's immediate 
family and the employer has a proprietary interest in the farm where they work; 
or 
(ii) the employer employed five or fewer persons other than immediate 
family members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 consecutive 
weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months. 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more than 
one employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an employer under 
this title. 
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not 
under this title has the right and option to come under it by complying with its 
provisions and the rules of the commission. 
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer 
retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, 
all subcontractors under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these 
subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer for the 
purposes of Chapters 1 and 2. 
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or 
remodelling a residence that the person owns or is in the process of acquiring as 
the person's personal residence may not be considered an employee or employer 
solely by operation of Subsection (6)(a). 
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not 
be considered an employee under Subsection (6)(a) if: 
(i) the partnership or sole proprietorship secures the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits pursuant to Section 35-1-46; and 
(ii) the employer who procures work to be done by the partnership or sole 
proprietorship obtains and relies on valid certification of the partnership's or sole 
proprietorship's compliance with Section 35-1-46. 
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be considered an employee 
under Subsection (6)(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under 
Subsection 35-1-43(4). 
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer under 
Subsection (6)(a), if the employer who procures work to be done by the 
contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on valid certification of the 
contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 35-1-46. 
Tab 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA, * 
* ORDER GRANTING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
v. 
OSMAN HOME IMPROVEMENT, 
CREDIT GENERAL INSURANCE, 
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' 
FUND asd ENRIQUE SOSA, 
Defendants, 
Enrique Sosa ("Enrique" hereafter) and the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") ask The 
Industrial Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Enrique 
was the employer of Arnulfo Steven Sosa ("Steven") and therefore liable for a portion of Steven's 
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
At the time of his work accident, was Steven employed by Enrique or by Osman Home 
Improvement ("Osman")? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On July 22,1995, while working as a roofer's assistant on a multi-unit apartment project in 
Sandy, Utah, Steven fell and injured his feet and ankles. The parties agree that Steven's accident 
arose out of in the course of his employment and that he is entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits. However, Enrique and Osman each argue that the other was Steven's employer at the time 
of the accident, and therefore liable for his benefits. 
Osman, a roofing company owned by Mike Osman, agreed during 1995 to place roofs on 
buildings comprising a new apartment complex in Sandy, Utah. Osman then advertised in the 
newspaper for roofers to work on the project. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
•k 
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Enrique, an experienced roofer, saw Osman's advertisement and inquired about the work. 
He did not submit a bid for the work, but instead, he and Mike Osman simply agreed that Enrique 
could work on the project and would be paid a piece rate of $14 per "square". Enrique set his own 
hours and provided his own-staple gun, compressor, saw, ladder and safety ropes. Osman provided 
all the necessary roofing materials. 
Osman did not inquire whether Enrique carried workers' compensation or liability insurance. 
Although Osman was a licensed contractor and familiar with the requirement of Utah law that 
contractors be licensed, Osman did not require that Enrique be licensed. In fact, Enrique has never 
been licensed as a contractor. 
Osman retained complete authority over the roofing project, including the power to dismiss 
roofers at any time for any reason. Roofers who wished to use assistants were required to obtain 
Osman's permission. 
A few days after Enrique was hired by Osman, Enrique told Steven, his nephew, that he also 
might be able to work on the Osman roofing project. Enrique took Steven to meet Mr. Osman and 
asked if Steven could work as his assistant. Mr. Osman consented. Thereafter, Mr. Osman actually 
observed Steven working on the project and voiced no objection. 
According to custom in the roofing trade, assistant roofers are compensated for their work 
by sharing in the piece rate earned by the experienced roofer to whom they are assigned. The 
amount of such compensation is negotiated between the experienced roofer and the assistant. 
Enrique and Steven agreed that Steven would be receive $10 per hour, to be paid from Enrique's 
piece rate of $14 per square. 
Enrique and Steven began work on the Osman roofing project on July 20, 1995. On the 
morning of July 22, 1995, Steven was laying down tar paper on the roof of one building while 
Enrique and another assistant were at work on the roof of a second building. Steven slipped from 
the roof and suffered injuries to his feet and ankles for which he is now entitled to receive workers' 
compensation benefits. 
After the accident, Osman paid Steven for his work up to the time of the accident. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The ALJ's decision in this matter concludes that Enrique was Steven's direct employer and 
that Osman was Steven's statutory employer, as that term is used in the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"). Enrique and the UEF challenge the ALJ's determination by arguing 
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that Osman, not Enrique, was Steven's direct employer. This issue is significant because the Act 
places primary responsibility for workers' compensation benefits on the direct employer. 
Section §35-l-43(l)(b) of the Act defines "employee" as follows: 
(E)ach person in the service of any employer . . . under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally 
working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is casual and not 
in the usual course of the trade, business or occupation of his employer. 
The first element in the foregoing definition of employee requires that the individual be "in 
the service of1 an employer. Utah's Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase "in the 
service of1 in Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). There, the Court held 
that "in the service of equates to the right of control. In Bennett and in Young v. Industrial 
Commission. 538 P.2d 318, the Court identified several factors which tend to establish control. 
Those factors were the extent and right of supervision, method of payment, provision of equipment, 
right to terminate, and whether the individual has other clients. The Court made it clear that the 
foregoing factors are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative. 
More recently, in Averett v. Grange. 909 P.2d 246,249 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
has emphasized the importance of the "control" test in determining whether an individual is an 
employee for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act: 
In workers' compensation cases, this court has consistently held that whether 
an employer-employee relationship exists depends upon the employer's right to 
control the employee. . . . "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is 
determinative." (citations omitted.) 
Osman attempts to characterize Enrique as an independent subcontractor and Steven as 
Enrique's employee. However, the evidence establishes that both Enrique and Steven were 
employees of Osman. Enrique was not independently established as a roofing contractor, but was 
instead what might be termed a "journeyman roofer", moving from job to job with an assortment of 
different employers. He maintained none of the trappings of an independent contractor, such as an 
office, insurance, advertising, or even the contractor's license required of independent building 
contractors by Utah law. 
The fact that Osman did not put the work in question out for bid is also indicative that 
Enrique was working as Osman's employee. Furthermore, Osman had unfettered control over all 
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aspects of the project. He could discharge any of the workers at any time. Even individuals such 
as Steven, serving as assistants to the experienced roofers, had to be authorized by Osman. Finally, 
the fact that Steven was paid directly by Osman is also consistent with Steven's status as his 
employee. 
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Enrique and Steven provided their own tools. 
That fact is not sufficient to establish an independent contractor status, particularly in light of the 
custom in the roofing industry for both employees and independent contractors to provide their own 
tools. 
Under ail the foregoing facts, the Industrial Commission concludes that both Enrique and 
Steven were "in the service of1 Osman. Consequently, Osman was Steven's direct employee at the 
time of his accident and is liable for workers' compensation benefits stemming from that accident. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission concludes that Osman Home Improvement was the direct 
employer of Amulfo Steven Sosa at the time of Mr. Sosa's work accident on July 22,1995. Osman 
Home Improvement and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Credit General Insurance, are 
therefore liable for the entire amount of Mr. Sosa's workers' compensation benefits, as those benefits 
have been identified in the prior decision of the ALJ. It is so ordered. 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request 
for reconsideration must be'received by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this 
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a 
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 
30 days of the date of this order. 
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